EVALUATING MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE IN A SUBSIDISED STATE-OWNED METRO: A RESPONSIBILITY-CENTRE APPROACH
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62536/sjehss.2026.v4.i5.pp74-84Keywords:
Controllability principle; responsibility accounting; factor decomposition; public service compensation; incentive regulation; executive remuneration; urban metro; state-owned enterprises.Abstract
When the losses of a state-owned transport operator are reimbursed by the budget, its net financial result says little about the work of its management. The paper proposes a method for evaluating management under such conditions and tests it on the data of JSC «Tashkent Metro». The change in the company's net result between 2024 and 2025 is decomposed by chain substitution into ten factors assigned to five responsibility centres (the state, traffic volume, the external environment, the owner and the executive body). Its robustness is checked with a symmetric decomposition and with alternative deflators. The net loss grew by only 2.6 billion soums, yet the component controlled by management deteriorated by 81.9 billion soums, while state decisions improved the result by 211.2 billion. Even under a 10 percent cost inflation assumption the controllable component remains negative at 50.7 billion soums. On this basis the paper derives a formula for ex-ante compensation of the social mandate with «inflation minus X» indexation of normative costs, and a remuneration formula in which a safety gate precedes all other indicators. The approach allows a supervisory board to hold management accountable for results it actually controls.
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