

EXPERIENCE OF REGULATING THE SECURITIES MARKET IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Turanboyev Boburjon Qodirjon o'g'li

Lecturer, Department of International Tourism and

Economics, Kokand University

boburturonboyev@gmail.com

Abstract:

The regulation of securities markets is a critical component of a stable and efficient global financial system. This article examines the diverse experiences of regulating securities markets in key foreign jurisdictions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and emerging markets like China. The analysis reveals a spectrum of approaches, from the disclosure-based, rules-intensive model of the U.S. to the principles-based, "twin peaks" structure of the U.K. and the harmonized, supranational framework of the EU. The findings indicate a global trend towards enhancing transparency, strengthening investor protection, and managing systemic risk, particularly in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. However, significant national differences persist, shaped by legal traditions, market maturity, and economic priorities. The article discusses the ongoing challenges posed by financial technology (Fintech), globalization, and the need to balance market innovation with financial stability, concluding that no single regulatory model is universally optimal.

Keywords: Securities Market, financial stability, globalization, financial technology, investor, liquidity, manipulation and crypto-assets.

Introduction

Securities markets are the engine of modern economies, facilitating capital formation, providing liquidity, and enabling risk diversification. They allow businesses to raise funds for investment and growth while offering individuals opportunities to build wealth. However, the inherent complexity of financial instruments and the potential for information asymmetry create significant risks, including fraud, market manipulation, and systemic crises. Consequently, robust regulation is not merely a bureaucratic necessity but a fundamental prerequisite for fostering the trust and confidence upon which healthy markets depend.

The core objectives of securities regulation are universally recognized: (1) protecting investors from malpractice; (2) ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent; and (3) reducing systemic risk that could destabilize the broader financial system (IOSCO, 2017). Achieving these objectives, however, has given rise to a variety of regulatory philosophies and

institutional designs across the globe. These frameworks reflect the unique historical, economic, and legal contexts of their respective jurisdictions.

The global financial crisis of 2008 served as a powerful catalyst for regulatory reform worldwide, exposing weaknesses in existing supervisory models and highlighting the interconnectedness of global financial markets. In its aftermath, policymakers embarked on a wave of reforms aimed at strengthening oversight, increasing capital requirements, and improving the resolution of failing financial institutions. More recently, the rapid rise of financial technology (Fintech), including algorithmic trading, robo-advisors, and crypto-assets, has presented a new frontier of challenges for regulators, forcing them to adapt long-standing rules to novel products and market structures.

This article provides a comparative analysis of the experience of regulating securities markets in several key foreign countries and regions. By examining the established models of the United States and the United Kingdom, the unique supranational approach of the European Union, and the evolving framework of China, this paper aims to distill key lessons and identify global trends. The analysis will explore the theoretical underpinnings, institutional architecture, and practical application of these diverse regulatory regimes, providing a comprehensive overview for policymakers, academics, and market participants.

Literature Review

The academic and institutional literature on securities regulation is vast, offering deep insights into the varying philosophies, structures, and challenges faced by jurisdictions worldwide. A review of this literature reveals a fundamental tension between rules-based and principles-based approaches, diverse institutional models for supervision, and a continuous evolution in response to crises and innovation.

The foundational philosophy of the United States model is rooted in mandatory disclosure, a concept extensively analyzed by legal scholars. Coffee and Sale (2021) explain that the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 created a "rules-based" system where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prescribes detailed regulations for issuers and intermediaries. This approach prioritizes legal certainty. In contrast, the United Kingdom model is famously "principles-based," a philosophy detailed by Julia Black (2010). She argues that setting high-level, outcome-focused principles allows for greater flexibility and adaptability to market changes than a rigid rulebook, though it can introduce legal uncertainty for firms.

The "Twin Peaks" model, adopted by the UK and Australia, is designed to resolve the inherent conflict between prudential soundness and market conduct. Taylor (2009), a key architect of the Australian model, argues that separating these functions into two dedicated regulators—one for financial stability (a prudential regulator) and one for consumer protection (a conduct regulator)—provides clearer focus and accountability. This contrasts with the centralized, sector-based model of the US SEC, which integrates both functions.

The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 in the US represented a monumental expansion of regulatory scope. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2012) provide a comprehensive analysis of global post-crisis

reforms, concluding that there was a universal move towards greater macroprudential oversight, with the creation of bodies like the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the US to monitor systemic risk.

In the European Union, the drive for a single market has led to a unique supranational framework. Lannoo and Casey (2011) document the "MiFID revolution," explaining how the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive created a harmonized rulebook for investment services across the EU. The subsequent implementation of MiFID II, as analyzed by the Bruegel economic think tank (2018), aimed to push this further by increasing market transparency through extensive pre- and post-trade reporting requirements, fundamentally altering the structure of European equity and bond markets. The role of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is critical here, acting as a coordinating hub to ensure "supervisory convergence" among the national regulators of the 27 member states (ESMA, official mandate).

The state-led model in China is a frequent subject of analysis. In their seminal work, *Red Capitalism*, Walter and Howie (2012) describe a system where the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) must balance market development with the state's overarching goal of social and economic stability. A report by the International Monetary Fund (2019) highlights China's ongoing efforts to align with international standards to attract foreign capital, noting the tension between its market-oriented reforms and its legacy of direct state intervention.

A report by the Financial Stability Board (2017) on Fintech credit highlights how regulators globally are struggling to apply decades-old rules to new technologies like peer-to-peer lending and crypto-assets. This requires a re-evaluation of regulatory perimeters and the development of new supervisory tools, often referred to as "RegTech." The consensus in the literature, as summarized by IOSCO (2017), is that regardless of the specific model, all effective regulation must serve the core objectives of investor protection, market integrity, and systemic stability.

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research methodology centered on a comprehensive and systematic literature review. The objective is to synthesize existing knowledge and expert analysis to build a coherent and comparative understanding of international securities regulation. This approach is appropriate as the field is well-documented in academic journals, government publications, reports from international bodies, and legal scholarship.

The research process involved several stages. First, a broad search for relevant literature was conducted using academic databases such as JSTOR, Google Scholar, and the Social Science Research Network (SSRN). The search also included the official websites of key regulatory bodies, including the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and international standard-setting bodies like the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).

Search terms included combinations of keywords such as "securities regulation," "financial market supervision," "investor protection," "comparative financial regulation," "SEC

enforcement," "MiFID II," "principles-based regulation," "rules-based regulation," and "Chinese securities market." The selection of literature for in-depth review was guided by several criteria: authority and rigor, jurisdictional focus, and relevance and timeliness, with an emphasis on works published after the 2008 financial crisis.

The selected sources were analyzed to extract key information on regulatory philosophy, institutional structure, core legislative acts, and enforcement mechanisms. The findings were then synthesized and organized thematically to form the basis of the Literature Review and Discussion sections.

Discussion

The effectiveness of a regulatory regime is best judged by its real-world application—the structures it uses for supervision and enforcement, and the tangible results it achieves. Examining specific processes in developed countries reveals the practical differences between their models.

In the United States, the SEC's formidable enforcement structure is a defining feature. When insider trading is suspected, the process is systematic. The SEC's Division of Enforcement uses sophisticated data analytics to flag suspicious trading patterns around major corporate announcements. If a red flag is raised, the structure involves issuing subpoenas for trading records, phone records, and testimony from witnesses. If evidence is strong, the SEC can file a civil complaint in federal court. A prominent result of this structure was the case against billionaire Raj Rajaratnam and his hedge fund, Galleon Group. The SEC's investigation uncovered a wide-ranging insider trading ring, leading to a civil penalty of \$92.8 million against Rajaratnam—a record at the time—and, following a parallel criminal investigation by the Department of Justice, a lengthy prison sentence. This result demonstrates the power of the SEC's investigative authority and its ability to secure significant penalties, serving as a powerful deterrent.

The United Kingdom provides a clear example of its "Twin Peaks" structure and principles-based approach in action. The structure separates the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which ensures firms are financially sound, from the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which governs market behavior. The Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SMCR) is a key tool for the FCA. This regime requires firms to map out responsibilities for senior staff, making them personally accountable for failures in their areas. A key result of this structure was the FCA's action against the former CEO of Barclays, Jes Staley. The investigation centered on his attempts to identify a whistleblower. While the PRA also investigated from a prudential standpoint, the FCA's conduct-focused investigation concluded that Staley had failed to act with "due skill, care and diligence," a breach of the principle of individual accountability. The result was a significant personal fine and a public censure, reinforcing the message that senior manager accountability is a cornerstone of the UK regulatory system.

Australia offers another powerful example of the "Twin Peaks" model in practice. Its structure consists of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). The effectiveness and potential failings of

this structure were laid bare by the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (2017-2019). The Commission's investigation revealed widespread misconduct by financial institutions, including charging fees to dead people and aggressive mis-selling of products. The Commission's final report was a damning indictment, concluding that ASIC had been too timid in its enforcement approach, preferring negotiation over litigation. The result was a seismic shift in regulatory strategy. The government provided ASIC with a massive funding boost and a clear mandate to adopt a "why not litigate?" stance. In the years following, ASIC launched a wave of high-profile lawsuits against major banks, securing hundreds of millions of dollars in penalties. This demonstrates how a country's regulatory structure can be stress-tested and its results dramatically altered by political and public pressure.

Finally, the European Union's harmonized structure under MiFID II has produced clear results in market transparency. Before MiFID II, a significant portion of share trading occurred in "dark pools"—private venues with no pre-trade transparency. MiFID II introduced a "double volume cap" mechanism, a complex rule designed to limit the amount of trading that can occur in the dark. The result, as documented by ESMA and various market analysis firms, was a significant and immediate shift in trading volume from dark pools back to transparent, public exchanges. While the rule has been criticized for its complexity, it achieved its primary objective of increasing market transparency, a tangible result of the EU's structure of imposing a single, detailed rulebook across all member states.

Conclusion

The experience of regulating securities markets in foreign countries offers a rich tapestry of models, philosophies, and institutional arrangements. From the disclosure-driven regime of the United States to the principles-based framework of the United Kingdom and the harmonized system of the European Union, each approach has been shaped by its unique context and continues to evolve in response to market dynamics and crises.

While no single model has emerged as definitively superior, a global consensus has formed around the core objectives of investor protection, market integrity, and financial stability. The post-2008 era has ushered in a period of intensified supervision, with a renewed focus on systemic risk and cross-border cooperation. The central challenge for the future will be to create regulatory frameworks that are robust enough to ensure stability yet flexible enough to accommodate beneficial financial innovation. As markets become ever more complex, digital, and interconnected, the task for regulators will only become more demanding, requiring a constant commitment to adaptation, international collaboration, and a deep understanding of the evolving financial landscape.

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